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Market Incentives, Recycling and the Price Spike of 1995 
 







Environmental economics assumes that reliance on price signals, adjusted for 
externalities, normally leads to efficient solutions to environmental problems.  We 
explore a limiting case, when market volatility created “mixed signals”: waste paper and 
other recycled materials were briefly worth an immense amount in 1994-95, then 
plummeted back to traditional low levels in 1996.  These rapid reversals resulted in 
substantial economic and political costs. 
 
A review of academic and business literature suggests six possible explanations for 
abrupt price spikes.  An econometric analysis of the prices of wood pulp and waste paper 
shows that factors that explained price changes in 1983-93 contribute very little to 
understanding the subsequent price spike.  From the econometric analysis and from other 
sources, we conclude that speculation, rather than “rational” economic factors, must have 
played a major role in the price spike.   
 
If speculatively driven price spikes can disrupt an environmentally important industry 
such as recycling, then the surprising implication for public policy is that measures to 
control or stabilize prices, far from interfering with the market, may actually help to make 
it more efficient. 
                                                                 
1 Thanks to Sumreen Mirza for skillful assistance in data analysis.  Helpful comments on an earlier draft 
were provided by Maarten DeKadt, Laurie Johnson, Thomas Kinnaman, Paul Ligon, Chaz Miller, Dick 
Parrott, and Irene Peters. 
  





Does reliance on price signals, adjusted for externalities or missing markets, lead to 
efficient, cost-minimizing solutions to environmental problems?  An affirmative answer 
to this question is taken for granted in most current discussion of environmental 
economics. Indeed, the desirability of market-based policy instruments has become the 
new conventional wisdom of the field. (For influential sources that make the general case 
for market-based policies, see Baumol and Oates 1988 and Stavins et al. 1988, 1991.) 
 
There are important environmental issues for which market-based policies provide an 
adequate response.  But there are equally important limitations to the uses of the market -
- and there is a far greater danger, at present, that the limitations will be overlooked.  To 
advance the understanding of the economics of the environment, it is helpful to analyze 
the limiting cases where the arguments for primary reliance on the market seem to break 
down.  (For a broader discussion of this point see Ackerman and Gallagher 2000). 
 
In this paper we explore the problems created by volatility in recycled material prices.  
What happens when the market sends mixed signals?  Our empirical example is a little-
studied episode which is important in its own right: the 1995 price spike in the markets 
for recycled materials.  Our goal is to understand that episode, not only for its own sake 
but also to draw out its implications for theory. 
 
Recycling should provide an ideal opportunity to test the effectiveness of market 
incentives.  There are well-established markets in the scrap materials that are recovered 
by recycling programs.  Public sector intervention often boosts the demand for these 
materials, for example through public procurement policies or recycled content 
legislation.  Such initiatives raise the prices for recovered materials, thereby making 
recycling more profitable.  This implicitly expresses the belief that there are positive 
environmental externalities associated with recycling of waste materials, which should be 
internalized through government policy. (For an explicit argument along these lines see 
Hanley and Slark 1994.)   Price movements in scrap markets, whether caused by private 
market forces or by public intervention, should guide private investment into collection 
and processing of materials.  To a large extent, this is exactly what happens.  Yet 
something went disturbingly wrong with the process in 1995. 
 
In examining the events of that year we will focus on the market for recycled paper -- the 
largest component of municipal recycling both by tonnage and by value, and the 
commodity for which prices rose fastest and farthest.  It may be helpful to provide a brief 
description of the use of recycled paper in the production process.  Paper is made from 
pulp, an intermediate product which is a soggy mass of fiber; pulp is most often made 
from wood, which is crushed and mixed with water in a pulp mill.  Recycled paper is 
valuable primarily because it is an alternative source of pulp.  Production of recycled 
pulp involves little more than churning recovered paper and water together in a giant 
blender, followed by removal of any contaminants that were collected with the paper (and 
for some grades of paper, removal of as much ink as possible).  Some new mills have the 
capacity to make both virgin and recycled pulp, but many facilities are designed for either  
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one or the other.   
 
Pulp and paper production are often vertically integrated, although there are also a 
significant number of firms which engage in only one stage or the other - enough so that 
there is a market price for pulp, which figures prominently in our empirical work in 
Section 3.  We will seek to understand the price of waste paper in the context of the 
economics of the paper industry, and particularly in relation to the price of pulp. 
 
We begin in Section 1 with a short discussion of the significance of the events of 1995, 
followed in Section 2 by a sketch of six theories about price spikes in commodity 
markets.  In Section 3 we then turn to a simple econometric analysis of the trends in 
prices for pulp and for waste paper, supporting the conclusion that the price dynamics of 
1994-96 were qualitatively different from other periods.  Based in part on that analysis, 
we review the evidence for the six theories in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5 with 




1. What happened in 1995? 
 
There was a time, in 1995, when common recycled materials were immensely valuable.  
Old newspapers, which had been worth next to nothing as recently as the end of 1993, 
were briefly selling for $200 per ton; prices of other materials soared as well (see Figure 
1, at end of text).  Municipalities passed ordinances prohibiting theft of the precious 
recyclables from curbside collection boxes.  For recycling advocates and enterprises it 
was an exhilarating moment -- and a fleeting one.  By 1996, in some cases even by late 
1995, the sky-high prices had fallen back to earth.   
 
Those who responded to the market signals of 1995 saw their fortunes falling as well.  
More than $1 billion was invested in planned recycled paper mills in 1994-95, most of 
which had closed by 1997 (Schifrin 1997).  Prins Recycling, the leading processor of 
recycled materials collected in Boston, Pittsburgh, and several other cities, had 500 
employees and $77 million revenues in 1995; it made long-term commitments to 
continue paying high 1995 prices for the materials it received, and went bankrupt by mid-
1996.  With somewhat less agony and drama, but still with significant losses, the leading 
waste management companies cut back sharply on their recycling divisions, which they 
had only recently expanded. 
It is difficult to interpret these events as efficient responses to market signals, although 
we will consider that possibility in the next section.  At the least a subtler, more guarded 
interpretation of price signals is needed when dealing with cyclical or volatile prices.  It 
cannot be efficient to make large, long-term investments on the basis of fast-changing 
prices.  Unfortunately, there is no simple way to determine which price changes should 
be dismissed as noise, and which should be treated as the true signal.  It is not always the 
case that rapid price changes are rapidly reversed.  A remarkably complete understanding 
of the dynamics of world commodity markets would have been required to correctly 
anticipate the abrupt reversal of the 1994-95 surge in scrap prices.  




That is, there are substantial information processing requirements for an efficient 
response to price signals in a volatile market, since short and medium-term volatility 
must be correctly filtered out.  Many, perhaps most, industry participants seemed to 
lacked that capability and were unpleasantly surprised by the effects of the price spike of 
the mid-1990s.  (Although the market for scrap paper has existed for decades, it expanded 
rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s, implying that many participants may have been new 
and inexperienced at the time of the price spike.) 
 
It was not only businesses who overreacted to the price spike.  Recycling advocates in the 
early 1990s presented their cause as an environmental crusade; those who spoke the 
language of economic theory would have asserted that their efforts were justified by large 
unpriced externalities associated with the production and disposal of materials.  However, 
as prices rose in 1994-95, many abandoned this argument in favor of the simpler, stronger 
claim that recycling was an immediately profitable, or cost-reducing, activity for 
municipalities to engage in.  It was an easy case to make, during the brief period in which 
it was obviously true.  The critics were not kind to the claims of profitability as prices, all 
too soon, began to fall.  (The most notorious critic was Tierney 1996; for interpretation of 
the debate see Ackerman 1997). 
 
 
2. Six theories of price spikes 
 
The 1995 spike was neither the first nor the last sudden increase in scrap prices.  A 
previous peak occurred in the late 1980s; a more recent upsurge occurred in 1999 and 
early 2000. (The 1995 spike was bigger and, as we will see, harder to explain than the 
ones before and after it.)  Why does this keep happening?  Could the same thing happen 
to other environmentally significant prices, with similarly chaotic impacts?   
 
Abrupt price spikes are surprisingly common in bulk commodity markets, and a number 
of theories have been proposed to explain them.  In this section we present six theories 
that are potentially relevant to the events of 1995.  The first five - two derived from 
academic economics, and three suggested by the business press - offer detailed 
mechanisms that can cause price spikes.  Several of these theories are compatible with 
models of rational behavior, in the sense that economists have traditionally understood 
the term.  The sixth theory is that price spikes represent speculative bubbles with little or 
no rational foundation. 
 
A.  In some market structures, inventory fluctuations may cause price spikes. 
 
The recent pattern of recycled material prices is far from unique in the history of 
commodity markets.  Many bulk commodity prices display qualitatively similar patterns: 
long periods of relatively small fluctuations are punctuated at irregular intervals by sharp 
upward spikes; similar downward spikes are quite rare by comparison.  Could this pattern 
be the natural result of a particular market structure? 
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An article by Deaton and Laroque (1992) demonstrates that episodic price spikes for 
agricultural commodities can be produced by a competitive market with storage.  Assume 
that there is inelastic demand, and large, unpredictable annual variation in the supply of a 
commodity, perhaps caused by the effects of weather on harvests.  Traders will buy and 
store excess supply in years of good harvests in order to sell it in bad years, thereby 
dampening the tendency toward price increases from a single bad harvest.  Occasionally, 
however, random variation will lead to consecutive bad harvests, exhausting the traders’ 
inventories.  At that point the price will shoot up abruptly, returning to a lower level at 
the time of the next good harvest. 
 
Generalization of this model to non-agricultural commodities has proved difficult, as the 
same authors candidly report (Deaton and Laroque 1996).  An analysis of daily 
fluctuations in metals prices (Brunetti and Gilbert 1995) develops a related model, in 
which the available stock of metals usually dampens price fluctuations; the model 
accurately predicts that day-to-day price volatility is higher when stocks are low relative 
to consumption.  Like the agricultural model, the metals model is analyzing price 
fluctuations over an interval much shorter than the time required to increase production -- 
which, in both cases, is the underlying reason why lack of inventory leads to price spikes. 
 
An exactly analogous model for paper could only explain price spikes of very short 
duration, shorter than the time it takes to expand paper production.  Inventory 
fluctuations still could have been one of several factors contributing to the 1994-95 price 
spike in recycled paper, even if they are not the sole cause.  
 
B. Macroeconomic trends may cause coordinated movement of commodity prices. 
 
Development economists analyzing the problems of very poor, commodity-exporting 
nations have identified the phenomenon of “comovement” of commodity prices: world 
prices for unrelated commodities often move up and down in a synchronized fashion.  
The development literature has debated whether or not there are common macroeconomic 
causes for commodity price comovement.   
 
In an examination of prices for nine unrelated bulk commodities, Pindyck and Rotemberg 
(1990) found that there was “excess comovement” well beyond anything that they could 
explain by the common effects of past, current, or expected future values of 
macroeconomic variables.  They guessed that excess comovement is due to the herdlike 
behavior of commodity traders, who influence each other’s optimism or pessimism about 
the direction of the markets.  In contrast, Deb et al. (1996) performed a similar analysis 
using different statistical tests, and found only weak evidence of excess comovement; for 
them, macroeconomic trends explained most or all of the observed coordination in 
commodity price movements. 
 
U.S. recycled materials prices could also be described as exhibiting a high degree of co-
movement in the mid-1990s, as seen in Figure 1.  The same question could be posed 
about these prices: If there were common macroeconomic causes for these price 
movements, the mystery would be solved.  On the other hand, if there were excess  
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comovement that could not be explained by macroeconomic trends, one might suspect 
that speculative or other socially coordinated influences were at work. 
 
C. Lags in capacity adjustment may lead to high prices in periods of rapid growth. 
 
Fluctuations in prices, output and capacity are the subjects of continual commentary in 
business periodicals.  In the paper industry, trade publications such as Pulp & Paper 
suggest that major firms are always scrambling, often somewhat belatedly, to respond to 
the latest phase of the business cycle.  Starting from the bottom of the cycle, the 
producers wait too long to expand.  As a result demand rises while capacity is still 
limited, driving prices up sharply.  Then when producers do build new capacity, it is too 
much and/or too late, glutting the market late in the cycle and forcing prices down.  A 
slump ensues, and the cycle begins again.   
 
Thus one theory derived from the trade press is that the 1995 price hikes reflected a 
normal cyclical imbalance.  The previous cyclical peak in the late 1980s led to very high 
paper prices, which induced over-expansion of capacity.  From 1989 to 1993 prices 
plummeted and little new capacity was added.  Then as demand revived in 1994, the 
industry was again unprepared and slow to expand; prices soared until capacity caught up 
with production. 
This is a far cry from recent fashions in microeconomic theory, which assume that market 
participants have substantial forecasting capabilities and use them to form “rational 
expectations.”  The twists and turns of the paper industry as seen in the trade press are 
closer to the simple, long-discarded cobweb model, with its repeatedly irrational 
expectations that current market conditions will persist.  If lagged cyclical overreaction is 
the norm, then price spikes can be expected once per cycle, at the point of (eternally 
unexpected) rapid growth in demand. 
 
D. Government policies to promote recycling raised the price of recycled paper in 
1994-95. 
 
In contrast to the previous story about businesses continually scrambling to catch up, 
imagine the situation of a paper company that tried to look ahead from the early 1990s.  
The popularity of recycling was spreading rapidly across the U.S.; a number of states had 
recently adopted recycled content laws mandating the use of newsprint with recycled 
content.  The Clinton administration announced in late 1993 that by 1998 all paper 
purchased by the federal government would have to have 30 percent recycled content.  A 
paper company could easily have concluded that the time was right to make a big 
investment in recycled paper production. 
 
The public sector was also involved in a more important but less obvious way, according 
to an article in Forbes (Schifrin 1997).  The 1993 executive order on recycled paper 
announced that bonds used to pay for investment in recycled paper mills would be 
exempt from federal taxes.  Several leading brokerage firms were looking for new tax-
exempt bonds to sell, and promoted the recycled paper mill bonds heavily, selling $1 
billion of them in 1994 and 1995.  At one point, planned new facilities amounted to three  
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times existing paper recycling capacity.  When the first new mills opened, their purchases 
increased the demand for recycled paper. But it soon became clear that the industry was, 
or was about to be, overbuilt.  By 1997 at least seven major new facilities, representing 
an investment of more than $500 million, had been closed, most of them defaulting on 
their bonds.  
 
The Forbes article, entitled “Sue the White House?”, is full of partisan hostility toward 
recycling, environmental protection, and the Clinton administration.  Nonetheless, its 
hypothesis deserves dispassionate consideration.  
 
E. Changes in export demand are a major influence on U.S. scrap paper prices. 
 
A final source in the business press offers yet another interpretation, based on changes in 
export markets.  The U.S. is a net exporter of scrap paper, supplying large amounts of 
recovered paper to Mexico, Korea, Japan and other countries with limited forest 
resources.  Throughout the early 1990s, consumption of paper was growing particularly 
rapidly in Korea and other Asian countries (excluding Japan), helping to drive up the 
price of both virgin pulp and scrap paper. 
Normally, scrap paper sells for so little that recycled pulp is cheaper than virgin.  
However, according to the Economist (1997), the unusually high 1995 prices made it 
profitable for foreign (virgin) pulp mills to increase production and compete for markets 
formerly supplied by American waste paper.  As pulp from other countries became more 
widely available, demand for U.S. scrap exports dropped and prices returned to a normal, 
low level.  
 
Generalizing this hypothesis somewhat, it could be the case that U.S. prices are driven by 
fluctuations in export markets, as well as by domestic economic conditions. 
 
F. Speculation is a major cause of the 1995 price spike. 
 
Speculative bubbles are a familiar fact of economic life, with well-known examples 
stretching back over several centuries.  There is strong evidence for speculative or crowd-
following behavior even in large, long-established U.S. financial markets where 
“rational” investors might seem most likely to predominate (Schiller 1989 - written 
before the stock market boom of the 1990s).   
 
The literature on the subject is far too extensive for comprehensive summary; one strand 
of theoretical analysis is captured in a review article on “informational cascades” 
(Bikhchandani et al 1998).  If market participants have limited sources of information, 
they may find that the current market behavior of others provides at least as much 
information as they can obtain in any other way.  Under this assumption, crowd-
following is rational for the individual, and the behavior of a few innovators can start a 
massive cascade of imitation. 
 
Speculation is an obvious candidate to explain the 1995 price spike.  It can easily account 
for the comovement of many different prices: once one or two materials experienced  
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price increases, all recycled material prices might have been subject to speculative 
pressures. 
 
In the econometric analysis, to which we now turn, we will attempt to explain price 
changes on grounds other than speculation.  Failure to explain the price spike (which is 
our essential result) strengthens the presumption that speculation is involved.  Following 
the econometric results, we return to an evaluation of each of the six theories, including 
anecdotal direct evidence of the role of speculation. 
 
3. The simple econometrics of pulp and waste paper prices 
 
Since recycled paper is used to make pulp, we would expect the price of waste paper to 
be closely related to the price of pulp.  In this section we develop simple econometric 
models of both prices, as functions of each other and of a number of other explanatory 
variables. 
Producer price indices for both pulp and waste paper are published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  Monthly data are available on a continuous basis beginning in July 1983 
(see appendix for description of data).  Figures 2 and 3 show the logarithms of real prices 
of pulp and waste paper over this period, with vertical lines at the beginning of 1994.  
Our strategy is to develop models for these price series based on the data before 1994 -- 
to the left of the vertical lines -- and then project those models forward to see how closely 
they fit the data for the price spike and beyond. 
 
The explanatory variables we tested are listed in Table 1.  Several of the variables - 
wages, capacity utilization, and inventory-to-shipment ratio - are readily available only 
for the paper industry as a whole (i.e. for the 2-digit industry, which includes pulp as well 
as paper production).  However, these variables may still provide useful indications of 
conditions in pulp and waste paper markets.       
 
   
 
  Table 1: Explanatory variables for pulp and waste paper price models 
 
  Input prices: 
    hourly wages for paper industry production workers  
    price of pulpwood 
    price of crude oil  
    price of electricity to industrial customers 
   
  Macroeconomic variables: 
    real GDP 
  U.S./Canadian exchange rate  Industry operating statistics:   
  capacity utilization in the paper industry 
    ratio of paper industry inventories to shipments 
 
  




More detail on the data series is provided in the appendix.  To deal with the problem of 
serial autocorrelation in the price series, we modeled first differences, i.e. month-to-
month changes in log real prices. 
 
Supply and demand: Pulp 
The price of pulp could be affected by both supply and demand factors.  On the supply 
side, input prices such as wages, energy prices, and the price of pulpwood logs (for virgin 
pulp) and waste paper (for recycled pulp) could all influence the price of pulp.  Increases 
in any of these input prices would be expected to cause increases in the price of pulp. 
 
On the demand side, growth of income (GDP) should increase the demand for paper, and 
hence drive up the price of pulp.  Turning to the effects of trade, Canada is the only 
significant source of pulp and paper imports in the U.S., and the leading competitor for 
export markets.  Therefore a decline in the value of the Canadian dollar should make 
Canadian products cheaper in U.S. dollars, holding down U.S. prices throughout the 
paper industry.   
 
Two industry operating statistics, capacity utilization and the ratio of inventory to 
shipments, are in effect measures of monthly variation in demand.  Both a higher capacity 
utilization and a lower ratio of inventory to shipments are signs that demand is 
approaching supply constraints, so both should be associated with increasing pulp and 
paper prices. 
 
Supply and demand: Waste paper 
For waste paper, it is difficult to model the supply.  Large quantities of both commercial 
and residential waste paper are routinely recycled.  The total supply rests on the behavior 
of millions of households and businesses, as expressed through thousands of recycling 
programs and enterprises.  For households, at least, it seems unlikely that there is any 
significant response to the price of scrap paper; attitudes toward and participation in 
recycling are not primarily market-driven (Ackerman 1997).  Rather, there has been a 
steady expansion of recycling programs around the country since the late 1980s. 
 
The supply of waste paper from businesses includes large quantities of production wastes 
(trimmings, misprints, overstock, etc.) from paper and printing companies, as well as the 
used office paper, cardboard boxes, and other items which are collected from end users in 
the waste management process.  Production wastes are the cleanest and most valuable; 
their supply is roughly proportional to total paper production, and is largely insensitive to 
price (see the analogous argument for metal scrap in Tilton 1999). 
 
Commercial and institutional paper recycling may be somewhat more sensitive to market 
conditions, but waste management is a very small factor in the costs of most enterprises.  
Only a portion of the paper recycling in the commercial sector comes from enterprises 
that respond to scrap price incentives in the expected manner.  Changing employee 
attitudes toward recycling, combined with the gradual spread of workplace recycling 
programs, may be more important than price signals for many firms where waste  
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management costs are small.  As in the residential sector, this would imply a steady 
growth of recycling (and of recycled paper supply), independent of market conditions, 
throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. 
The demand for waste paper reflects market conditions in the paper industry, similar to 
those discussed for pulp.  In fact, the price of pulp directly affects the market for waste 
paper: when the price of pulp increases, there should be increases in demand and price for 
inputs into pulp production such as waste paper.  The demand for recycled pulp, and 
hence for waste paper, should also increase when inputs into virgin pulp production 
become more expensive.  That is, the price of waste paper could be positively correlated 
with the price of labor, energy, or pulpwood logs (recycled pulp production is less energy 
and labor-intensive than virgin pulp).   
 
Other demand-side variables discussed above - GDP, Canadian exchange rate, capacity 
utilization, and inventory/shipments ratio - could affect the price of waste paper for the 
same reasons as for pulp.  However, if markets functioned perfectly, most or all of the 
influence of these variables would be transmitted through their effects on the price of 
pulp, which would in turn affect the price of waste paper. The Canadian exchange rate 
could exert a separate influence on export markets: the lower the Canadian dollar, the 
cheaper Canadian exports will be, causing downward pressure on U.S. scrap export 
prices.  That is, we would expect Canadian paper exports to be directly competing with 




Our results support some but not all of our hypotheses.  For the period July 1983 through 
December 1993, the ratio of inventories to shipments, the price of pulpwood, the 
Canadian exchange rate, and both measures of the price of energy had no significant 
effects on price of either pulp or waste paper.  For pulp we estimated 
 
)PPULP(t) = -.451  +  .229 C(t) +.244 C(t-1) +.290 )W(t) +3.23 )Y(t) +.090 )PWASTE(t) 
(t stats)      (-6.31)    (2.62)       (2.85)           (1.82)            (4.64)        (2.34) 
    adjusted r
2 = .407    DW = 1.73 
where 
  PPULP  = log real price of pulp 
  C  = capacity utilization in paper industry (measured from 0 to 1) 
  W  = log real hourly wage for paper industry production workers 
  Y  = log real GDP 
  PWASTE= log real price of waste paper 
  )  = first difference (current month minus previous month) 
 
This estimate shows that changes in the price of pulp are sensitive to current and last 
month’s capacity utilization in the paper industry, as well as to changes in wages, GDP, 
and the price of waste paper.  The wage elasticity of the pulp price is a plausible 0.29 
(and the corresponding t statistic, the lowest reported here, just misses being significant at 
p=.05).  The surprisingly high income elasticity of 3.23 reflects the experience of the late 
1980s, when many materials prices, including pulp, were synchronized with the business  
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cycle.  This earlier cycle spans a large part of the period we analyzed.   
 
For waste paper, only the long-term change in capacity utilization and the previous 
month’s price of pulp were significant: 
 
)PWASTE(t) = -.0058  + .588 * [C(t) - C(t-10)] + .387 )PPULP(t-1) 
                    (-2.03)    (5.84)                             (2.56) 
    adjusted r
2 = .294    DW = 1.50 
 
The effect of pulp prices on waste paper (.387) is more than four times as large as the 
effect of waste paper prices on pulp (.090), as would be expected based on the relative 
size of the two markets.  Remarkably, the price index for waste paper does not respond to 
the business cycle, nor to most of the other variables we tested.  It does, however, have a 
strong statistical relationship to the change, over a period of many months, in paper 
industry capacity utilization.  This could be interpreted as speculation about the future 
likelihood of capacity shortages: waste paper becomes more valuable when the paper 
industry is moving up toward full capacity, as estimated by the trend in capacity 
utilization.  For more discussion of the lag structure in the waste paper equation, see the 
appendix. 
 
Both equations, modeling month-to-month changes in noisy price series, fall well short of 
explaining all of the observed variation.  Nonetheless, they capture important economic 
causes, or correlates, of price changes.  Numerical integration of the estimated monthly 
changes yields the forecasts shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
The key result is clear from the figures: neither equation comes close to explaining the 
price spike.  The economic relationships that prevailed in the previous decade were an 
extremely poor guide to the events of 1994-96.  The estimates based on the pre-1994 pulp 
equation appear to become roughly accurate again for 1998-99 (see Figure 4), suggesting 
that the same long-term economic relationships may still apply to the price of pulp.   
 
The comparable estimates for waste paper are much too low for the end of the decade 
(see Figure 5), as would be expected: structural change in the industry led to much 
greater use of waste paper, and hence greater demand, in the course of the 1990s.  Our 
estimate continues the downward trend in real waste paper prices that characterized the 
earlier period.  In contrast, the actual price was still fluctuating wildly, but no longer 
obviously declining, in the late 1990s. 
 
4. Evaluating the theories 
 
What light do our results shed on the theories presented in Section 2?  We address each 
of the six theories in turn. 
 
A. Inventory fluctuations 
 
One of the greatest surprises in our econometric analysis is the absence of a significant  
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relationship between price changes and the ratio of inventories to shipments.  If an 
inventory model were appropriate for the mid-1990s price spike, it seems likely that the 
inventory variable would be more strongly related to prices in the preceding years. 
 
The relationship between inventories and prices is stronger during 1994-96 than it was in 
the preceding decade.  However, the movement in the inventory/shipment ratio was 
modest: averaging 1.23 in 1983-93, and 1.26 in 1993 alone, it dropped only to a 
minimum of 1.05 in June 1995 before rebounding.  Moreover, the timing is wrong for a 
model in which inventory declines cause price hikes.  The prices of both pulp and waste 
paper reached lows in November 1993 and then began rising steadily; the 
inventory/shipment ratio did not fall noticeably below its 1993 level until June 1994, 
seven months into the price surge.  This is the pattern that would be expected if 
unexpected price increases caused panic buying in an attempt to beat future price rises, as 
discussed below.  Then price increases cause unexpected increases in purchases, 
eventually decreasing inventories. 
 
B. Macroeconomic trends 
 
This hypothesis would provide a satisfying answer if there were any common 
macroeconomic factors driving up commodity prices in 1995.  If, for example, the year 
had been a business cycle peak, with demand approaching or surpassing full capacity in 
numerous industries, then recycled materials might have been suddenly more in demand.  
However, this did not occur.  The business cycles of leading industrial countries were less 
synchronized in the early 1990s than in the 1980s; in fact, business cycle troughs 
occurred in 1991 in the U.S., in 1993 in several European countries, and in 1995 in Japan 
(IMF 1996).  As subsequent events revealed, 1995 was not a business cycle peak in the 
U.S., nor in most other economies. 
 
Common macroeconomic trends provide a better explanation for the previous, late 1980s 
peak in scrap prices, and for the subsequent peak in early 2000.  At those times, 
international business cycles were more closely synchronized, and many industries were 
expanding rapidly.  If recycled materials are viewed by industry as a less desirable 
substitute for virgin materials, then it is easy to imagine that they are suddenly more in 
demand when virgin material production reaches its limits.  This theory is a plausible 
explanation for the late 1980s and for 2000, but does not fit the facts for 1995. 
 
Our econometric results are relevant here: if it were true that macroeconomic trends 
caused the coordinated increases in many prices in 1994-95, then it should be possible to 
estimate an equation that fits the data both before and during the price spike. Our failure 
to do so does not, of course, prove that it is impossible; there is plenty of room to 
improve on our estimates, particularly for waste paper.  However, our results do show 
that no simple function of GDP, capacity utilization, inventories, wages, energy prices, 
and exchange rates will do the trick.  Accordingly, we doubt that there is a common 
macroeconomic cause of the 1995 spike in materials prices. 
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C. Capacity adjustment lags 
 
On any theory, capacity adjustments are crucial to pulp and paper prices, reflecting the 
industry’s high fixed costs.  The high degree of uncertainty about the appropriate level of 
capacity is illustrated by the fact that 38 percent of major capacity expansions in the 
paper industry announced between 1978 and 1991 were never completed (Christensen 
and Caves 1997).   
 
However, this does not mean that the industry is always out of step with demand.  If 
industry’s lagged overreaction to cyclical fluctuations were to blame, then there should 
be a negative relationship between current capacity utilization and past price changes.  As 
prices go up, industry overinvests in new capacity, so capacity utilization eventually goes 
down.  As prices go down, industry stops investing, capacity stops growing, and capacity 
utilization eventually goes up.  In separate explorations of our database, we have failed to 
find any evidence of this relationship.  Thus we doubt the importance of persistent lagged 
overreactions. 
 
D. Government intervention 
 
Changes in public policy undoubtedly played a part in increasing the prices of recycled 
paper in 1994-95.  In contrast to the other theories, government intervention should have 
shifted demand from virgin to recycled production.  If this was a major factor in paper 
markets, the price for competing virgin materials should have gone down as a result.  On 
this theory one would expect that the price of waste paper would rise above the forecast 
based on pre-1994 conditions, while the price of pulp would fall below the corresponding 
forecast.  Yet Figure 4 makes it clear that the price of pulp, like waste paper, rose sharply 
above the forecast during the price spike.  The effect of government intervention 
evidently was swamped by other factors. 
 
 
E. Export demand 
 
At first glance this theory is broadly consistent with the facts; exports of U.S. scrap paper 
did rise and then fall sharply, as shown in Table 2.  The increase in the quantity of 
exports coincided with the increase in price, confirming that there was a shift in demand.  
Likewise, the decrease in exports coincided with the decrease in price, again providing 
evidence of a demand shift.  In contrast, the overall supply of recovered paper grew 
almost steadily, driven by the spread of local recycling programs rather than by the 
market.  





However, it would be easy to overstate the significance of scrap exports for the paper 
industry in the mid-1990s.  From 1993 to 1995 net exports rose only from 17.5% to 
22.3% of all recovered paper, then fell back to 16.0% by 1997.  Extraordinary 
assumptions about the sensitivity of prices to export demand are required to turn this 
moderate fluctuation into a principal cause of the massive price movements of those 




Thus far we have seen that plausible econometric estimates of price changes, based on 
the data and market relationships through 1993, fall far short of predicting the price spike 
of the mid-1990s.  Moreover, most of the theories that could account for the price spike 
are inappropriate or inadequate to the task.  It is increasingly difficult to resist the notion 
that the price spike was primarily a result of speculation.  
 
In effect, we are treating speculation as the null hypothesis, confirmed by default when 
the other theories fail.  However, there is also more affirmative evidence.  
Econometrically, the relationship of the waste paper price to long trends in capacity 
utilization suggests that buyers and sellers are gambling that past trends will continue.  
Anecdotally, we have identified several accounts in which market participants refer to the 
role of speculation in 1995. 
 
A speculative bubble conjures up images of ill-informed outsiders, foolishly bidding up 
the price of an unfamiliar and perhaps worthless asset: tulip bulbs, unseen or imaginary 
real estate, or even tax-exempt bonds for unneeded paper recycling mills.  In terms of the 
market for scrap paper, the new mills that opened in 1994-95 inevitably hired new, 
inexperienced paper buyers who may have been prone to speculative excesses.  Such 
images, however, fail to capture a crucial part of the picture.  Under certain conditions, 
even well-informed, long-term industry participants can be driven to speculating on price 
changes. 
 
A handful of quotes reveal an awareness of speculation within the industry.  Commenting 
Table 2. Net exports of U.S. recovered paper, 1993-97 
  Total recovered 





1993  35.4  6.2  17.5% 
1994  39.6  7.7  19.4% 
1995  42.1  9.4  22.3% 
1996  42.9  7.6  17.7% 
1997  45.0  7.2  16.0% 
Source: American Forest & Paper Association website, 
www.afandpa.org.  
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on the 1995 price spike, a Midwestern paper broker told a journalist, “When buyers sense 
a future rise in prices, they buy as soon as possible and contribute to demand, which in 
turn pushes the price up further... when buyers sense that prices are going to fall, they 
back off to see if prices will go lower.  When buyers back off, demand goes down, which 
in turn causes prices to fall further.” (NRC 1996) 
 
A columnist in Pulp & Paper elaborated on the same theme: “The reality is that each 
member of the chain, from the forest to the merchant, can and does amplify, even distort, 
the impact of the business cycle.  Forest owners can hold back wood sales in anticipation 
of higher prices tomorrow... The paper maker -- seeing apparent orders mounting, 
seeking pulp price hedging, and nervous about the fixed capacity of the pulp pipeline -- 
moves fast to secure pulp stocks... Merchants -- also believing the [supply] chain to be 
inflexible -- exaggerate order levels into waves, each merchant seeking apparent supply 
security and price hedging, but in actuality stretching the chain to its limits... Each 
member of the chain behaves logically in terms of the perceived constraints and nature of 
their businesses, in the face of competitive demands.” (Wilson 1997) 
 
A final quote, from a market research report by the U.S. Commerce Department, 
describes the dynamics of paper prices in Europe in 1995: “The high demand for finished 
paper products at the beginning of 1995 created a temporary pulp shortage during the 
second quarter, resulting in an increase of prices from $700 to $925/ton.  This price rise 
caused pulp buyers to increase their orders in anticipation of further price hikes, creating 
a ‘false’ demand for pulp until the fall of 1995 and filling inventories to capacity.” 
(Bellelis 1997) 
 
On this model, the cause of price increases is the fact that prices are increasing.  Rational 
buyers scramble to buy more before the price increases even farther.  Once anything 
creates an awareness of greater than expected price increases -- perhaps a small surge in 
export demand, perhaps a small push from government policy -- then everyone, even 
those who ultimately know better, will be driven to behave in ways that make prices rise 
even faster.  These are the conditions that create an “informational cascade,” as discussed 




In the end, what does the 1995 price spike for recycled materials mean for the theory of 
markets and market incentives?  The market briefly sent a powerful, misleading signal 
about the merits of a category of environmentally significant investments, probably based 
largely or entirely on speculation.  The market then abruptly reversed itself, sending a 
very different signal.  Responding to these mixed signals, investors lost substantial sums 
of money, businesses dedicated to recycling were driven out of business, and advocates 
and policy makers were left confused and disorganized.  The outcome, in short, was the 
antithesis of efficiency. 
 
Purchasers trapped in a speculative price spiral behave, on a limited scale, like everyone 
does during episodes of hyperinflation: when prices are rising rapidly, it is better to buy  
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now before your money loses more of its purchasing power.  The importance of 
preventing hyperinflation is widely understood and accepted; efficient and sensible 
economic activity is impossible when prices are soaring rapidly upward.  Indeed, any 
threat of even a modest level of inflation now inspires active countermeasures from the 
Federal Reserve, the one area in which there is currently a broad political consensus 
supporting public intervention in the market economy. 
 
If price stability is so important for the economy as a whole, can it be unimportant for 
particular industries?  Since there are substantial sunk costs of industry-specific physical 
and human capital, there is a limit to the velocity at which resources can efficiently flow 
in response to changing price signals.  Attempts to exceed that speed limit can result in 
losses like those seen in recycling in the mid-1990s.  
 
Most markets are stable most of the time; speculative price spirals are the exception, not 
the rule.  Thus one important question concerns the sources of price volatility.  An 
analysis of metals markets in the 1980s identified the growing reliance on commodity 
exchanges and the decreasing concentration of the industry as sources of increasing 
volatility (Slade 1991).  That is, competitive market structures, as evidenced by auction-
type exchanges and low concentration ratios, may actually promote price instability.  The 
stock market, another auction-type market with numerous participants, is a case in point.  
The accounts of speculation in the paper industry, quoted in Section 4, could be seen as 
reflecting the lack of vertical integration: the paper product life cycle involves several 
sequential transactions, each of which is vulnerable to speculative pressures. 
 
The fact that “perfect competition” is essentially unknown in reality, and price stickiness 
remains pervasive throughout the U.S. economy (Blinder et al. 1998) may be a source of 
strength, not weakness.  Oligopolies with explicit and implicit contracts, taking months 
rather than days to respond to market signals, are far less prone to speculative price 
spirals than, say, day traders and commodity brokers. 
 
From this perspective, the instability of recycling prices in 1995 could reflect the relative 
novelty and recent supply expansion of recycled materials.  The surge in recycling 
efforts, starting in the late 1980s, had led to large increases in the quantity of recovered 
materials; these materials were not yet firmly integrated into industrial production 
processes by the mid-1990s.  As the new supply of materials is eventually incorporated 
into long-term contracts, the opportunities for price volatility will diminish.  The next 
price spike, in 2000, was somewhat smaller; in that year the peak real price of waste 
paper was “only” three times its previous trough, compared to five times the previous 
trough in 1995.   However, with prices only tripling now and then, one cannot say that 
price stability has been achieved in scrap paper markets. 
 
The implication for public policy is that efforts to stabilize recycling prices, far from 
interfering with the market, can make it more efficient.  Working to create new markets 
for recycled materials, a popular strategy for state recycling agencies, may lead toward 
reduced volatility, and thus to fewer unpleasant surprises and speculative losses of the 
sort seen in the mid-1990s.  Looking beyond the range of current strategies, would price  
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ceilings or limits on the rate of price increases have helped to puncture the bubble in 
recycled paper markets, and ultimately reduced the losses that were incurred? 
 
It might seem mistaken to look for large lessons in such a small problem as the recycling 
price spike of 1995.  Recycled materials are a small part of the economy, and almost all 
markets are stable almost all of the time.  On the other hand, the price spike was a large 
and painful experience for those who were involved, and the same speculative market 
pathology could easily break out again, in the same or other markets.  Ironically, it may 
be features that economic theorists disparage as market imperfections which account for 
price stability in most markets.  In cases where stability is lacking, government 
intervention in price-setting, far from interfering with the market, may be just what is 
needed to make the market operate efficiently. 
 
Appendix: Data sources and modeling approach 
 
The data used in this paper were downloaded from the websites of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Commerce Department.  Details are 
available from the authors on request.  Price series are producer price indexes; they are 
deflated by the producer price index for finished goods (as is the hourly wage series).  In 
view of the slow and steady pace of inflation for most of the period being analyzed, the 
choice of deflator appears to be of secondary importance. 
 
There is a lengthy break in the waste paper price index in 1982-83, since budget-cutting 
efforts at the start of the Reagan administration included a temporary suspension of the 
collection of many price series.  Price data are available without interruption starting in 
July 1983. 
 
Several data series - capacity utilization, inventory/shipment ratio, and production worker 
wages - were readily available only for the pulp and paper industry as a whole, not for 
pulp mills alone.  (There is even less hope of distinguishing recycled from virgin pulp 
production in government statistics.)  Thus we often used paper industry totals. 
 
Most of the data series used here are reported on a monthly basis.  For real GDP we used 
linear interpolation between the quarterly figures released by the Commerce Department 
(assigning the quarterly figure to the middle month of the quarter).  For the Canadian 
exchange rate we used monthly averages of daily spot rates from the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
 
The monthly real prices of pulp and waste paper are nonstationary time series.  
Regressions using prices (or log prices) as the dependent variables suffer from extreme 
autocorrelation.  We addressed this problem by using first differences of the price series 
and most other data.  The only exceptions are capacity utilization and the inventory to 
shipments ratio.  In these cases, economic theory suggests that a high level of capacity 
utilization, or a low ratio of inventory to shipments, should be associated with an increase 
in price.  That is, the levels of these two independent variables should be correlated with 
changes in the price variables.  




Most of the economic relationships that we tested in our regressions are relatively short-
term ones, implying that current values or very short lags are appropriate for the 
independent variables.  A notable exception is the influence of capacity utilization.  Since 
it may take up to two years to expand capacity, it seems reasonable to explore long lags 
in the effects of capacity utilization on prices.  For the pulp price equation, long lag 
structures are in practice unnecessary: the combination of the current and previous 
months’ capacity utilization fits the data as well as any longer or more complicated lag 
structure.  For the waste paper price equation, however, we initially found a positive 
effect of current capacity utilization, and a slightly (not significantly) larger negative 
effect of capacity utilization lagged many months.  The most coherent economic 
explanation of these estimates seemed to be that the price responds to the change in 
capacity utilization over many months.  Thus we constrained the equation to have exactly 
that form, resulting in the estimate shown in the text. 
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 Figure 2:  Price index for pulp, deflated by PPI for finished goods.  Vertical line is at January 1994.  Source: BLS website.
 Data: Real price of pulp














eFigure 3: Price index for waste paper, deflated by PPI for finished goods.  Vertical line is at January 1994.  Source: BLS website. 
 Data: Real price of wastepaper














eFigure 4:  Actual price from Figure 2; estimated price from equation described in text, fitted to pre-1994 data (left of vertical line).
Estimated vs actual price of pulp
















ActualFigure 5: Actual price from Figure 3; estimated price from equation described in text, fitted to pre-1994 data (left of vertical line). 
Estimated vs actual price of wastepaper
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